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INTRODUCTION 
 
 “[D]igital is saving music,” one music industry power-player recently 
claimed.1 At first glance, this appears to be true. In 2013, the revenue from 
digital music was $5.9 billion, an increase of 4.3% over the previous year. 
Digital consumption is a fast growing source of revenue for record labels re-
sulting from mass consumer utilization of digital services as a primary music 
source.2 As of 2013, there were over five hundred digital music companies3 
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ogy Policy. J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2014; 
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 1 Richard Smirke, IFPI Digital Music Report 2013: Global Recorded Music Revenues 
Climb for First Time Since 1999, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1w9RJtr (quoting Edgar Berger, President and CEO, International, Sony 
Music Entertainment) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2 INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2014, at 6 (2014), 
available at http://commcns.org/1lNtskq; see also Press Release, Strategy Analytics, Global 
Digital Music Sales to Top $8.6 Billion in 2012: Streaming Revenues Up 40% Compared to 
8.5% for Downloads (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/TNM25V. Digital 
streaming services have become widely used for listening to music and news. See, e.g., 
Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Nearly A Third of Consumers Using Streaming Services: 
Report, BILLBOARD.BIZ (July 9, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://commcns.org/1pbI7MO (“Nearly a 
third of consumers in 25 countries around the world now use a music streaming service.”); 
Online Radio Audience Jumps 30 Percent in Past Year: Study, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Apr. 10, 
2012, 4:26 PM), http://commcns.org/1jSOYaF (“[O]nline weekly radio audience is now at 
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offering downloading and streaming services.4 Amid the myriad of evolving 
business models in digital services, musical content creators, copyright owners, 
and others with vested copyright interests have struggled to navigate an ever-
changing licensing landscape. While the explosive growth of new digital music 
delivery methods benefits the public by exposing listeners to a greater breadth 
of musical content, it remains unclear how these technological advancements 
will affect content-creator compensation and, also, whether digital consump-
tion can fully replace the decline of the traditional radio delivery method.5 One 
critical and complex question arising out of the Internet radio expansion6 is 
whether the current royalty-payment scheme adequately applies to these new 
methods of delivery and satisfies the interested parties, particularly as the tradi-
tional record industry model of terrestrial radio7 and brick-and-mortar sales 
continues to decline.8 
The important issue as to whether the compulsory royalty rate for Internet 
radio broadcasters is equitable in relation to other digital payment models arose 
                                                                                                             
an estimated 76 million Americans. The figure represents a more than 30% increase from a 
year ago and is 29% of the U.S. population.”). 
 3 INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2013, at 6 (2013), 
available at http://commcns.org/1pbIcjH. 
 4 For an interesting discussion of downloading and streaming, see WILLIAM W. FISHER 
III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 17–18 
(2004). Downloading is defined as the “transmission over the Internet of a digital copy of an 
audio or video recording, followed by storage of that file on the recipient’s computer, ena-
bling the material to be replayed repeatedly on demand.” Id. at 17. Methods of streaming 
include interactive and noninteractive streaming. Interactive streaming occurs “[a]t the re-
quest of the recipient [and involves] transmission over the Internet of a digital copy of an 
audio or video recording, which is then ‘played’ but not stored.” Id. Interactive streaming 
enables users to request specific music and artists “on-demand,” but does not allow those 
users to store the music. Id. Noninteractive streaming involves the same process as that of 
interactive streaming, however, the specific music played does not occur at the request of 
the recipient. Id. at 17–18. 
 5 See, e.g., Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Download Sales Off to Terrible Start in 
2014, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Jan. 23, 2014), http://commcns.org/1mgTvSw (“The cycle is clearly 
evident: the growth of streaming services negatively impacts digital purchases and puts 
additional pressure on the music business to generate new revenue by growing streaming 
services.”); Erin Griffitch, Can Traditional Radio and Pandora Live Together in Harmony? 
Terrestrial Broadcaster Hope So, ADWEEK (Oct. 6, 2011), http://commcns.org/S9nMJW 
(“Terrestrial radio isn’t going anywhere, according . . . to terrestrial radio execs.”). 
 6 See discussion infra Part I.A–C. 
 7 “Terrestrial radio” is identified as “the traditional broadcast radio that has been avail-
able as AM and FM stations. Licensed radio stations utilize the electromagnetic spectrum to 
transmit an analog signal containing content on a specified frequency, with specified power 
source within a specific geographic region.” 1 ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND 
BUSINESS PRACTICES § 1:59 (3d ed. 2013). 
 8 See Matthew Perpetua, Digital Sales Eclipse Physical Sales for the First Time, ROLL-
ING STONE (Jan. 6, 2012), http://commcns.org/1on0MFp (“According to data released by 
Nielsen SoundScan, digital sales were up by 8.4 percent from 2010, while physical album 
sales declined by 5 percent.”). 
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with the recently proposed Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012 (“IRFA”).9 Al-
though the proposed legislation did not pass in 2012,10 an examination of the 
IRFA will help guide future rate proposals. The IRFA highlights a debate over 
whether the current digital music licensing system disproportionately favors 
specific business models at the expense of online broadcasting companies and, 
in the long run, consumers.11 
With major technology companies entering the Internet radio market,12 the 
royalty disparity between webcasters and other digital music models needs to 
be settled.13 Given that consumers expect access to digital-content on multiple 
devices for a one-time fee,14 common sense dictates that copyright owners face 
an increasingly uphill battle to secure more favorable royalty rates. Inevitably, 
these countervailing interests threaten the music industry’s traditional business 
model. These interests challenge all parties involved to satisfy an increasingly 
insatiable consumer desire for unbridled access to a broad library of digital 
music, while adequately compensating content creators and owners. 
This paper centers on the debate regarding compensation to content owners 
and the alleged disparate royalty rates paid out to copyright owners among 
varying digital delivery methods. Part I of this paper provides an overview of 
webcasting, defining and broadly delineating the varying models. Part II dis-
cusses the background of copyright law and the history of the webcasting li-
censing scheme. Part III provides an overview of digital music licensing 
schemes and the disparate treatment of various digital music deliveries. Part IV 
examines the recently proposed IRFA, the debate surrounding its proposal, and 
the implications of some of the Act’s proposals becoming law. Finally, Part V 
proposes that the webcasting licensing controversy may best be resolved 
through the adoption of the willing buyer and willing seller (“WBWS”) stan-
                                                
 9 The Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, S. 3609, 112th Cong. (2012); The Internet 
Radio Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 10 Rick Marshall, The Quest for “Parity”: An Examination of the Internet Radio Fair-
ness Act, J. COPYRIGHT SOCIETY OF THE U.S.A. 445, 463 (Sept. 9, 2013) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://commcns.org/1h6dINM. 
 11 158 Cong. Rec. S6628, S6628 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2012) (statement of Sen. Wyden) 
(introducing the Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, S. 3609 and stating that “Consumers 
and rightsholders are increasingly seeking innovative, new models that can better promote 
music and compensate artists”). 
 12 One such technology company is Apple, which entered the Internet radio market with 
iTunes Radio. See iTunes Radio—Hear Where Your Music Takes You, APPLE, 
http://commcns.org/1nqg9gM (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 13 Senator Wyden recognized the royalty-rate disparity in his introduction remarks for 
IRFA. See 158 Cong. Rec. at S6628 (statement of Sen. Wyden) (lauding IRFA as treating 
Internet radio, “for purposes of establishing royalty rates, in the same way that satellite and 
cable radio are treated”). 
 14 Publishers Must Realign with Consumer Expectations for Digital Media, YOUGOV 
(Jan. 5, 2011), http://commcns.org/1kFpAW2. 
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dard,15 as that would be the most appropriate and workable solution amenable 
to all parties involved. 
I. OVERVIEW OF WEBCASTING 
 
A. Defining Webcasting 
 
Webcasting, otherwise known as Internet radio, involves noninteractive 
digital audio transmissions broadcast over the Internet to a consumer.16 The 
listener selects a genre or a station, and then the webcaster streams specific 
songs for the chosen genre or station.17 The webcaster transmits a digital audio 
or video file over the Internet to the end-user, who listens to or views the file 
without keeping permanent copies of the webcast transmission.18 
 
B. Types of Digital Music Services 
 
Internet-music services are provided by a range of companies19 and operate 
under a subscription or advertising business model.20 For instance, some 
webcasters, like Pandora, utilize a statutory webcasting scheme.21 Others, like 
Sirius XM Radio, offer paid, subscription-only music services.22 Still, other 
companies simulcast23 through the Internet, like Clear Channel,24 which is 
                                                
 15 See infra Part IV.C. 
 16 Karen Fessler, Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 399, 399 n.4 
(2003). 
 17 See, e.g., Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Mar. 16, 2012) 
[hereinafter Pandora 2012 Form 10-K]. 
 18 AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 1481, 1516 (4th ed. 2010). For 
clarification, neither the term “Internet radio” nor “webcasting” refers to interactive digital 
services. However, as demonstrated herein, an industry standard definition of “webcasting” 
is lacking, leading some to lump both interactive and noninteractive services under the 
webcasting definition. Considering interactive and noninteractive services are subject to 
different royalty rates, this is problematic. Id. 
 19 Some of the companies include Pandora, Spotify, iTunes, Amazon, Google, Rhap-
sody, Slacker, Rdio, and MOG. Don Sears, Why the Online Music Industry Is a Mess, 
CNNMONEY (Aug. 30, 2012), http://commcns.org/1raenlu. In addition to the assortment of 
companies in the Internet-music industry, a plethora of services exist, such as those identi-
fied by Harry Fox Agency (“HFA”). HFA’s Digital Definitions page describes the wide 
variety of digital services in existence and exemplifies the absence of an industry standard 
as to what exactly “webcasting” encompasses. Digital Definitions, HARRY FOX AGENCY, 
http://commcns.org/TNMu4f (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). These differing types of service 
contribute to royalty rate confusion among types of digital delivery methods. 
 20 Sears, supra note 19. 
 21 See discussion infra Part II.C–D. 
 22 Sirius XM Radio Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 6, 2013). 
 23 For a definition of “simulcasts,” see the CARP’s report. In re Rate Setting for Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, Docket No. 2000-9 
DTRA 1 & 2, at 82 (Copyright Arb. Royalty Panel Feb. 20, 2002) [hereinafter CARP Re-
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available on the Internet through iHeartRadio.25 Public institutions, such as 
National Public Radio (“NPR”), provide noncommercial services through not 
only traditional, terrestrial means, but also through their websites.26 All of these 
services represent a mere cross-section of the numerous digital services of-
fered. 
One of the benefits of the variety of Internet radio services is that users are 
able to participate in more personalized radio experiences. For instance, serv-
ices like Last.fm,27 Pandora, iHeartRadio and Slacker,28 create automatic, cus-
tomized playlists for listeners from a single reference point—an artist, genre, 
decade or theme. Users have some control over their listening experiences and 
can skip to the next song in a playlist created for them by an algorithm or by 
the company’s staff.29 
 
C. Who Listens to Webcasting? 
 
Today, more Americans still listen to terrestrial radio than Internet radio. 
According to a February 2012 study, approximately 241 million people in the 
United States listen to radio each week.30 A growing percentage of Americans 
(about 39% or an estimated 103 million) listen to Internet radio every month, 
accounting for roughly one out of every three Americans.31 Self-reported data 
indicates that, in 2012, Internet radio listeners tuned-in for approximately 9.5 
hours per week.32 Only 13% of those that listen to Internet radio do not listen to 
                                                                                                             
port] (defining simulcast as “services which simultaneously stream (retransmit) their over-
the-air broadcasts via the internet”). 
 24 Press Release, Clear Channel, Clear Channel Extends Reach of Iconic Radio Brands 
via XM Satellite Radio (June 8, 2011), http://commcns.org/1jnD4B6. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Ways to Listen to NPR, NPR, http://commcns.org/1h6dYMC (last visited Mar. 22, 
2014). 
 27 Last.fm is a music recommendation service through which users subscribe and down-
load “The Scrobbler”—an algorithm that helps users discover more music based on the 
songs you play. About, LAST.FM, http://commcns.org/S9nXVR (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). In 
addition, Last.fm allows users to tag tracks and join discussions with other Last.fm sub-
scribers. Id. 
 28 Slacker is a music customization service that allows users to access a music library 
containing 10 million licensed tracks and over 200 stations. About Slacker, SLACKER, 
http://commcns.org/1kiqJmP (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 29 See, e.g., About Pandora, PANDORA, http://commcns.org/RtSmxp (last visited Mar. 3, 
2014) (utilizing an algorithm); About Slacker, supra note 28 (using staff to create the sta-
tions for listeners). 
 30 ARBITRON & EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH, THE INFINITE DIAL 2012: NAVIGATING DIGI-
TAL PLATFORMS 10 (Apr. 12, 2013), http://commcns.org/1pbIM0O (for comparison and 
growth purposes). 
 31 Id. at 19. 
 32 Id. at 21. 
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over-the-air, traditional radio.33 
Importantly, this listener data merely estimates the number of consumers 
tuning into webcasting and is not entirely accurate, due to limited collection 
methods and an absence of a central database tracking Internet radio data. Re-
gardless, the upward trajectory is clear: based upon similarly reported data in 
2003, Internet radio is soaring in popularity.34 In 2012, Pandora constituted 
5.6% of the Internet radio market in the U.S., and, in 2013, it grew to constitute 
8% of the market.35 Young adults are the key demographic, as evidenced by a 
study led by the NPD Group, which found that digital listenership of free on-
line radio is most popular among young adults ages 18 to 25.36 
Furthermore, research indicates that an important impetus behind the popu-
larity of streaming and Internet radio services is the consumer’s ability to listen 
to music free of charge and the easy discoverability of new music and artists.37 
These are the benefits of noninteractive streaming services offered by Internet 
radio providers, which are unlike on-demand services that require users to 
choose the specific artists or songs to whom or to which they prefer listening.38 
Webcaster-provided content curation enables listeners to enjoy the music pas-
sively; music is selected for the user based upon a broad genre or a station, and 
the webcaster selects other artists similar to the initial genre or artist selected 
by the consumer.39 
 
D. Internet Radio Listening Devices 
 
At the inception of Internet radio, listeners could only access online radio 
stations through their desktop personal computers.40 Since then, webcasting has 
also become available on mobile devices.41 Joe Kennedy, former chief execu-
tive officer and president of Pandora, envisioned Internet radio further expand-
ing away from pure personal computer engagement. Kennedy explained that 
Pandora is “penetrating areas where people traditionally listen to radio, with 60 
                                                
 33 Id. at 22. 
 34 Id. at 12–13 (using a chart to show that, in 2003, 17% of those surveyed reported 
listening to Internet radio, while, in 2013, 45% of those surveyed reported listening to Inter-
net radio). 
 35 DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2013, supra note 3, at 17. 
 36 Press Release, NPD Grp., Online Radio Is the Fastest Growing Music Listening Op-
tion (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://commcns.org/1mufkzY. 
 37 DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2013, supra note 3, at 9. 
 38 FISHER, supra note 4, at 18. 
 39 See About Pandora, supra note 29 (describing Pandora’s content-curation algorithm). 
But see We Are Beats Music, BEATS MUSIC, http://commcns.org/1tGQHmr (last visited Mar. 
3, 2014) (discussing the role of staff in creating music stations). 
 40 DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2014, supra note 2, at 16. 
 41 Id. (“Underpinning . . . [the music industry’s transformation into a global digital busi-
ness] is the global shift of music consumption to smartphone-based mobile platforms.”). 
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brands of car supporting Pandora radio,” but Pandora is “also now accessing 
the living room with 650 home consumer products now supporting Pandora.”42 
Listening to music on the go has become a “core activity” for smartphone and 
tablet users43—perhaps one reason why Apple and Beats Music, among others, 
have entered the Internet radio market.44 Consumers see music as important to 
the mobile experience.45 Smartphones are the third most popular device for 
listening to music and are used more often than MP3 players.46 In Pandora’s 
fiscal year ended January 31, 2013, mobile-phone and connected-device users 
accounted for 77% of the total listener hours.47 Tablet owners also heavily use 
their devices to listen to music. A study in June 2012 found that 51% of tablet 
owners used their tablets to listen to music, compared with 42% who used 
them to read books.48 Despite this wide-range of diverse services offered to 
consumers, digital services and sales, such as permanent digital downloads,49 
fail to compensate for the steep decline in physical, brick-and-mortar purchases 
that generate crucial royalty income for copyright owners.50 The inability of 
digital sales and webcasting to replace lost revenue for content creators should 
ultimately play into the calculation of royalties for digital services. 
 
 
 
                                                
 42 DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2013, supra note 3, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43 Id. at 23. 
 44 See, e.g., Apple, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 3 (Oct. 30, 2013) [hereinafter 
Apple, Inc. 2013 Form 10-K] (describing the ability of users to utilize iTunes Radio, the free 
Internet streaming service introduced September 2013, on a variety of Apple devices, such 
as iOS devices, Mac and Windows personal computers, and Apple TV); Press Release, 
Beats Music, Beats Music Is Here (Jan. 11, 2014), http://commcns.org/1nN11Wr (highlight-
ing the importance of mobile devices by advertising Beats Music’s Internet radio service as 
allowing up “to five family members across 10 devices” to use the service). 
 45 See ACCENTURE, THE 2013 ACCENTURE CONSUMER ELECTRONICS PRODUCTS & SERV-
ICES USAGE REPORT 26 (2013), available at http://commcns.org/1k9MUqm (reporting that 
30% of tablet users and 31% of smartphone users consider important the “[a]bility to use 
your preferred streaming music service”). 
 46 DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2013, supra note 3, at 23. 
 47 Pandora Media, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 15–16 (Mar. 18, 2013) [herein-
after Pandora 2013 Form 10-K]. 
 48 ONLINE PUBLISHERS ASS’N, A PORTRAIT OF TODAY’S TABLET USER WAVE II, at 19 
(2012), available at http://commcns.org/1raeLjQ. 
 49 A permanent digital download is defined as each delivery of a “phonorecord by digi-
tal transmission of a sound recording (embodying a musical composition) resulting in a 
reproduction made by or for the recipient which may be retained and played by the recipient 
on a permanent basis. PDDs are sometimes referred to as full downloads or untethered 
downloads.” Digital Definitions, supra note 19. 
 50 Ed Christman, What’s Behind the Digital Download’s Decline and Can Streaming 
Save the Day?, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Jan. 10, 2014), http://commcns.org/1mug0oM; see Per-
petua, supra note 8. 
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II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN A MUSICAL 
CONTEXT 
 
A.  The Basics of Copyright Law 
 
Before describing the Internet Radio Fairness Act and its proposed Internet 
radio royalty standards, an overview of the basics of copyright law is essential. 
Today, under the Copyright Act of 1976, the payment of music-licensing roy-
alties may involve two copyrights: the copyright for the musical work,51 and 
the copyright for the sound recording.52 The term “musical works” includes the 
compositions, while a “sound recording” is a work that results “from the fixa-
tion of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.”53 A striking delineation 
between these two copyrights is that musical works may be “fixed” in more 
than one sound recording. For instance, “Over the Rainbow,”54 the musical 
ballad made famous by Judy Garland in The Wizard of Oz, has been recorded 
countless times by different artists.55 Each time a recording of “Over the Rain-
bow” is performed or a copy of a sound recording is sold, the original compos-
ers of the composition receive a royalty payment for their copyright ownership 
in the song, while the recording artist or record label of each individual record-
ing receives compensation for its individual sound recording only, depending 
upon the format in which the recording is performed.56 
Notably, the rights granted to songs versus sound recordings under the 
Copyright Act differ. The copyright owner in a musical composition—unlike 
the owner of a sound recording57—possesses an additional exclusive right of 
                                                
 51 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 52 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “sound recordings”). 
 53 17 U.S.C. § 101; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 50, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION 
FOR MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS 1 (2012), available at http://commcns.org/1k9N0OD (“Musi-
cal works include both original compositions and original arrangements or other new ver-
sions of earlier compositions to which new copyrightable authorship has been added.”). 
 54 The underlying musical work of “Over the Rainbow” includes music by Harold Arlen 
and lyrics by E.Y. Harburg. See Harold Arlen Biography: We’re Off to See the Wizard, 
OFFICIAL HAROLD ARLEN WEBSITE, http://commcns.org/1jSRduy (last visited Mar. 5, 2014); 
see also Harold Arlen Detailed Song List, SONGWRITERS HALL FAME, 
http://commcns.org/S9oc39 (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
 55 Search Results for “Over the Rainbow,” ALLMUSIC, http://www.allmusic.com (search 
“over the rainbow”; then follow “Songs” hyperlink to filter search results) (last visited Mar. 
23, 2014). 
 56 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a)–(b) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting the sound re-
cording owner fewer rights under the Copyright Act than the owner of the musical work). 
See generally IRS, TRAINING 3153-101, MARKET SEGMENT SPECIALIZATION PROGRAM ON 
ENTERTAINMENT: MUSIC INDUSTRY (1994), available at http://commcns.org/1mgURgg 
(identifying the compensation schemes in the music industry). 
 57 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (granting the exclusive public performance right to the 
copyright owner of musical works), with 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (“The exclusive rights of the 
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public performance under section 106(4):58 “the owner of copyright . . . has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize . . . in the case of . . . musical . . . works 
. . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly . . . .”59 In other words, the copy-
right laws grant the composer (i.e., the owner of the musical work) the exclu-
sive right to authorize the public performance, while the performer (i.e., the 
owner of the sound recording) has not been granted that right.60 The varying 
rights bestowed upon copyright owners in differing types of creative works 
exemplify the highly detailed scheme embodying Congress’s judgment as to 
the appropriate balance between intellectual property protection granted to 
copyright owners, and public access to users and consumers of such works. 
 
B. Compulsory Licensing 
 
While copyright owners receive exclusive rights of their copyrighted works, 
some limitations are imposed.61 One set of limitations or exceptions occurs 
through “compulsory licenses,” which enable a user to pay a fee to a copyright 
owner for use of the copyrighted content that would ordinarily violate one of 
the copyright owner’s exclusive rights granted under the Copyright Act,62 re-
sulting in an implicit contract between the user and copyright owner. The user 
pays the copyright owner a fee set by the government and, in return, must 
abide by regulations set by the Copyright Office.63 This compulsory license 
enables the content owner to prevent activities infringing on his or her exclu-
sive rights, but compels the owner to grant others permission to engage in ac-
tivities subject to these compulsory licensing terms.64 Compulsory licensing is 
an important and beneficial instrument for multiple reasons: It cuts down on 
costly, drawn-out negotiations with recalcitrant copyright owners,65 and trans-
                                                                                                             
owner of copyright in a sound recording . . . do not include any right of [public] perform-
ance under section 106(4).”), and 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the 
exclusive rights to . . . in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”). 
 58 See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a). 
 59 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). 
 60 Shourin Sen, The Denial of a General Performance Right in Sound Recordings: A 
Policy That Facilitates Our Democratic Civil Society?, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233, 234 & 
n.4 (2007). 
 61 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (2012) (stating that a copyright owner cannot prohibit 
the performance or display of a work in an educational setting). 
 62 FISHER, supra note 4, at 41. 
 63 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73, COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING AND DIS-
TRIBUTING PHONORECORDS 1 (2011), available at http://commcns.org/1jVdFV7 (“The 
Copyright Office’s regulations set out in detail the procedures that must be followed to op-
erate under a compulsory license.”); see also FISHER, supra note 4, at 41. 
 64 FISHER, supra note 4, at 41. 
 65 Id. 
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actional costs are reduced.66 While compulsory licensing can also exist for me-
chanical rights, in this paper, the focus primarily centers on the compulsory 
licensing of sound recordings in digital transmissions under section 115 of the 
Copyright Act. 
 
C. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act67 
 
Another type of exclusion from the rights granted to copyright owners ap-
pears in the form of the “public performance” right. While the public perform-
ance right continues to be excluded with regard to sound recordings performed 
in the terrestrial radio format,68 the right garnered some recognition in other 
formats beginning in the early 1990s. Starting in the mid-1990s, the “public 
performance” right’s applicability to other technological mediums was ad-
dressed by Congress through the Digital Performance Right in Sound Record-
ings Act of 1995 (“DPRA”). At that time, terrestrial radio was no longer the 
sole format for broadcast radio.69 The 1990s saw a shift, championed by entre-
preneurs, from music consumption via the purchase of physical products to 
digital consumption of music services, where consumers pay for access to digi-
tal libraries of recorded music.70 Such services involved webcasting, which 
                                                
 66 ROBERT P. MERGES, CATO, NO. 508, COMPULSORY LICENSING VS. THE THREE 
“GOLDEN OLDIES”: PROPERTY RIGHTS, CONTRACTS, AND MARKETS 1 (2004), available at 
http://commcns.org/S9ogjr (“From its inception in the U.S. in the early 20th century, com-
pulsory licensing has been seen as a means of making intellectual works available by reduc-
ing some of the transaction costs associated with obtaining permission to use copyrighted 
material.”). 
 67 See generally Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 68 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize . . . in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”) This impliedly means that only 
digital audio transmissions, not terrestrial broadcasts are covered. For a more in-depth 
discussion regarding the lack of a terrestrial public performance right in sound recordings, 
see Laura E. Johannes, Hitting the Right Notes: The Need for a General Public Performance 
Right in Sound Recordings to Create Harmony in American Copyright Law, 35 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 445, 455 (2011). 
 69 H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 12–13 (1995). The House Report on DPRA stated: 
[A] small number of services have begun to make digital transmissions of recordings avail-
able to subscribers. Trends within the music industry, as well as the telecommunications and 
information services industries, suggest that digital transmission of sound recordings is 
likely to become a very important outlet for the performance of recorded music in the near 
future. Some digital transmission services . . . will be interactive services that enable a 
member of the public to receive, on request, a digital transmission of the particular record-
ing that person wants to hear. 
Id. at 12. 
 70 KEVIN PARKS, MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT IN AMERICA: TOWARD THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 
166 (ABA Publishing 2012). 
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advantageously provided clearer transmission of content in relation to physical 
products, required less power to air broadcasts over the Internet, and allowed 
digital broadcasters to offer highly specialized music formats, including spe-
cific genres, artists, and even songs.71 
Even though these advances in content-delivery methods benefitted con-
sumers, the industry met such developments with skepticism. Music industry 
stalwarts, like the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”),72 
worried that such developments would result in a “home-taping” situation, 
enabling listeners to record content streams on-demand and store it on their 
home computer’s hard-drive.73 The fear was that such copying could result in a 
near-perfect, digital copy embodying clear, crisp sound and would undercut the 
need for brick-and-mortar store purchases of physical records.74 
In 1991, the Copyright Office released a study acknowledging that a “digital 
audio transmission” right would affect the music industry and made a formal 
recommendation to implement a performance royalty in order to offset lost 
brick-and-mortar sales.75 Subsequently, in 1993, both houses of Congress in-
troduced performance right legislation addressing this very problem.76 Then, 
copyright owners and broadcasters began meeting privately regarding the per-
formance right.77 Terrestrial radio broadcasters claimed that they still served a 
                                                
 71 Id. 
 72 The RIAA is a trade organization operating to support the record labels. See Who We 
Are, RECORDING INDUSTRY ASS’N AM., http://commcns.org/1k9NaWe (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013). 
 73 PARKS, supra note 70, at 166. Congress appears to have recognized this concern, 
because the House noted the home-taping dilemma in its report on the DPRA. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-274, at 21 (1995). 
 74 See Eric Leach, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Digital Performance 
Rights But Were Afraid to Ask, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 191, 219 (2000) (“[T]he very 
real possibility of making digital copies of digital transmission meant that music listeners 
would no longer need to purchase an original recording at a music store. Indeed, this fear of 
record store replacement was one of the principal motivations for the [DPRA].”). See 
Kristine J. Hoffman, Comment, Fair Use or Fair Game? The Internet, MP3, and Copyright 
Law, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 159 (2000) (describing the RIAA’s pursuit to protect its 
members’ copyright interests against emerging digital technologies like the sharing of MP3s 
via the Internet). The RIAA’s fears of digital copies supplanting sales seem to have been 
realized with the creation of Napster, the Internet service that facilitated the transmission of 
MP3 files between and among its users. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 
1010–11 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing Napster’s service). 
 75 Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 1506 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act 
of 1995, 104th Cong. 164, 188 (1995) (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights). 
 76 See generally Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1993, H.R. 
2576, 103d Cong. (1993) (House of Representative’s version of the bill); Performance 
Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1993, S. 1421, 103d Cong. (1993) (Senate’s version of 
the bill). 
 77 PARKS, supra note 70, at 166. 
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promotional function for artists and, thus, should not owe artists a performance 
royalty.78 Congress agreed with terrestrial radio broadcasters and refused to 
grant Internet broadcasters the same leeway—most likely because the digital 
transmissions were high quality and made consumers less likely to buy physi-
cal compact discs.79 Congress believed that Internet broadcasting posed a 
greater threat, because it could exceed the broadcasters’ claimed boundary of 
mere “promotion” and supplant music sales with webcasts.80 Out of these dis-
cussions, in 1995, emerged the DPRA.81 
The DPRA82 further expanded the copyright holder’s rights by granting an 
additional right to the sound recording copyright owner: the right of digital 
audio transmission.83 The right of sound recordings specifies that no one may 
“perform [a] copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion” without permission from the copyright owner.84 This means that sound 
recording copyright owners are entitled to royalties when their music is played 
via Internet radio, satellite radio, or cable radio stations. 
Importantly, the digital transmission right granted was significantly en-
hanced in two ways. First, the right does not extend to “eligible nonsubscrip-
tion transmissions,” which primarily referred to the retransmission of AM/FM 
radio broadcasts over the Internet.85 Second, the DPRA implemented a compul-
sory blanket license for “noninteractive subscription transmissions.”86 Thus, 
                                                
 78 Johannes, supra note 68, at 455, 463–64. 
 79 Id. at 454–55, 455 n.58. 
 80 See Leach, supra note 74, at 216–19 (describing the difference between analog and 
digital transmissions and the resulting implications of the higher quality of digital transmis-
sions). 
 81 See generally Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336, (1995). See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the 
Digital Millennium, 23 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 137, 167 (1999). 
 82 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 § 2, 109 Stat. at 336. 
 83 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012). 
 84 Id. 
 85 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6) (2012). More specifically, the subsection states: 
An “eligible nonsubscription transmission” is a noninteractive nonsubscription digital audio 
transmission not exempt under subsection (d)(1) that is made as part of a service that pro-
vides audio programming consisting, in whole or in part, of performances of sound record-
ings, including retransmissions of broadcast transmissions, if the primary purpose of the 
service is to provide to the public such audio or other entertainment programming, and the 
primary purpose of the service is not to sell, advertise, or promote particular products or 
services other than sound recordings, live concerts, or other music-related events. 
Id. 
 86 See Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 
33,266, 33,266 (May 23, 2000) (“Among the limitations on the performance was the crea-
tion of a . . . compulsory license for nonexempt, noninteractive, digital subscription trans-
missions . . . .”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)–(3), (f) (imposing the compulsory license 
for nonexempt, noninteractive, digital subscription transmissions). The statute defines a 
“nonsubscription” transmission as “any transmission that is not a subscription transmis-
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any service under this definition can, so long as it complies with the licensing 
terms, play any sound recording without seeking permission from the copy-
right owner at a royalty rate set by the then-called Copyright Arbitration Roy-
alty Panel (“CARP”), an ad hoc body that set rates for the various compulsory 
licenses under the Copyright Act.87 The Act provided, however, that the CARP 
would only step in if copyright owners and noninteractive subscription services 
failed to reach voluntary rate agreements under the compulsory license.88 In the 
absence of such an agreement, CARP set the compulsory rate using the stan-
dard set in section 801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act.89 
 
D. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”)90 
 
Following the DPRA’s passage, a dispute arose regarding the licensing ob-
tained by webcasters for their streaming of sound recordings.91 Webcasters 
maintained that they were exempt from section 106(6).92 The recording indus-
try argued to the contrary, claiming that webcasters were not exempt from sec-
tion 106(6) and that webcasters needed the sound recording copyright owners’ 
consent prior to Internet transmission.93 The crux of the dispute was whether 
webcasters needed direct licensing from the sound recording owners.94 The 
dispute was between nonsubscription webcasters (who claimed an exemption 
from section 106(6))95 and the recording industry (who asserted that the ex-
emption was inapplicable).96 Important to the dispute was the fact that tradi-
tional radio broadcasting and other “analog” transmissions were exempt from 
these provisions under the DPRA, because the webcasters believed that Con-
gress intended to exempt the streaming activities.97 
                                                                                                             
sion.” Id. § 114(j)(9). A “subscription” transmission is any “transmission that is controlled 
and limited to particular recipients, and for which consideration is required to be paid or 
otherwise given by or on behalf of the recipient to receive the transmission or a package of 
transmissions including the transmission.” Id. § 114(j)(14); see also id. § 114(j)(15) (“A 
‘transmission’ is either an initial transmission or a retransmission.”). 
 87 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 § 3, 109 Stat. at 341–42. 
 88 Id. 
 89 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012). 
 90 See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified, as amended, in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 91 CARP Report, supra note 23, at 8. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Terry Hart, A Brief History of Webcaster Royalties, COPYHYPE (Nov. 28, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/1lNtYyQ. 
 95 In its current form, § 106(6) provides that the owner of the sound recording copyright 
has the exclusive right to “perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital 
audio transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012). 
 96 Hart, supra note 94; see also CARP Report, supra note 23, at 8. 
 97 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). If retransmitted or “simulcast” over the Internet, traditional 
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In 1998, Congress settled the escalating contention by passing the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,98 a controversial and expansive piece of 
legislation that has shaped the current digital-licensing regime.99 The DMCA 
added eligible nonsubscription services to the types of webcasting services 
subject to the compulsory licensing provision.100 Further, the DMCA altered 
the standard that the CARP must apply when determining royalty rates for 
these compulsory licenses.101 Instead of the section 801(b)(1) standard, the 
CARP would, for the webcaster compulsory license rates, “establish rates and 
terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been ne-
gotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller” 
(known as the WBWS standard).102 However, the DMCA maintained the exist-
ing section 801(b)(1) standard for preexisting subscription services and preex-
isting satellite radio services, including SiriusXM Radio.103 
The DMCA settled the dispute over whether webcasting is subject to the 
section 106(6) digital performance right and whether webcasters who transmit 
sound recordings on an interactive basis, as defined by section 114(j) of the 
Copyright Act, must secure consent from individual owners of such recordings 
and negotiate fees.104 When webcasters provide non-interactive services, then 
                                                                                                             
radio broadcasting signals lose their exemption and fall within the Section 114 license. Bon-
neville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 498 (3d Cir. 2003); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) 
(giving exclusive public-performance rights to sound recorders). The Bonneville court 
quoted the Senate’s report for the following proposition: “The classic example of [an ex-
empt transmission under Section 114(d)(1)(A)] is a transmission to the general public by a 
free over-the-air broadcast station, such as a traditional radio or television station . . . .” 
Bonneville Int’l Corp., 347 F.3d at 498 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 19 (1995)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
 98 CARP Report, supra note 23, at 8. See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2006)). 
 99 Allen Bargfrede & Cecily Mak, The State of Digital Law, BERKLEE COLLEGE MUSIC 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2014), http://commcns.org/1w9TYgh. 
 100 Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound 
Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240, 45,240 (July 8, 2002). 
 101 CARP Report, supra note 23, at 9. 
 102 Id. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Note the difference between the WBWS 
standard and the 801(b)(1) standard. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 114 (f)(2)(B) (2012) (“In estab-
lishing rates . . . [for] eligible nonsubscription services and new subscription services, the 
Copyright Royalty Judges shall establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates 
and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and 
a willing seller.”), with 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (2012) (requiring the Copyright Royalty 
Judges to: maximize the work’s public availability; give the copyright owner a fair return 
and the copyright user a fair income; reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and 
copyright user; and minimize any disruptive impact on prevailing industry practices). 
 103 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 405(a)(2), 112 Stat. at 2895. More specifically, 
the DMCA stated, “In establishing rates and terms for preexisting subscription services and 
preexisting satellite digital audio radio services, in addition to the objectives set forth in 
section 801(b)(1) . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
 104 CARP Report, supra note 23, at 8–9. 
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those providers are eligible for compulsory licensing.105 For that reason, Con-
gress created a new compulsory license in section 114(d)(2) and (f)(2) for “eli-
gible nonsubscription transmissions,” including webcasters’ non-interactive 
transmissions of sound recordings.106 The webcaster must comply with several 
requirements, in addition to those for subscription services, to be eligible for 
the compulsory license.107 Of the webcaster royalties, 50% would be distributed 
to copyright owners and 50% would be distributed to performers.108 
Thus, the performance of a musical work through a digital audio transmis-
sion requires the webcaster to obtain three licenses: a license for the public 
performance of the musical composition, which is generally obtained from a 
PRO;109 a license for the public performance of the sound recording for digital 
audio transmissions;110 and a license for the creation of ephemeral copies of the 
sound recording used in the transmission process.111 
 
E. The Webcaster Settlement Acts of 2008112 and 2009113 
 
The development of the webcasting royalty scheme did not end with the 
DMCA, but was further complicated when CARP convened the first rate-
setting proceedings for statutory webcasting in 2002 for the time periods of 
1998–2000 and 2001–2002;114 and then again in 2005 for the time period of 
                                                
 105 Id. at 8. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 8–9. 
 108 Id. at 9. 
 109 Id. at 5 n.6. 
 110 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106 . . . 
“); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize . . . in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted 
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”). 
 111 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(1) (2012). Section 112(a)(1) provides that a webcaster making a 
digital broadcast transmission of a performance of a sound recording on a nonsubscription 
basis may make a single copy or phonorecord of a particular program if: (1) the copy is 
retained and used solely by the webcaster for its own broadcasts within its local service 
area; (2) no further copies are made; and (3) the copy or phonorecord is destroyed within six 
months after the first public transmission, unless preserved exclusively for archival pur-
poses. Id. 
 112 See generally Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114). 
 113 See generally Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114). 
 114 CARP Report, supra note 23, at 1–2 (“[T]his [CARP] . . . has been empanelled to set 
compulsory license fees for eligible nonsubscription digital audio transmissions of sound 
recordings as provided for in § 114 of the . . . [DMCA], as well as for the making of ephem-
eral copies . . . as provided for in § 112 of the DMCA.”). 
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2006–2010.115 In 2004, amidst all of the rate-setting proceedings, Congress 
passed the Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004 
(“CRDRA”), which replaced the CARP with a permanent panel of judges, re-
fined the arbitration procedures to establish licensing rates, and required peri-
odic adjustments to those rates for digital services subject to compulsory li-
censing.116 The permanent, three-person panel of judges was the Copyright 
Royalty Board (“CRB”).117 The CRB (formerly the CARP) had a legislative 
mandate to set royalty rates for compulsory licenses.118 
Then, in 2008, Congress passed the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008 
(“WSA”)119—which was extended in 2009120—to encourage settlements of roy-
alty disputes for statutory webcasting rates.  The WSA permitted SoundEx-
change,121 the principal administrator of statutory licenses under sections 112 
and 114 of the Copyright Act, and webcasters to negotiate settlements of ongo-
ing disputes arising out of the royalty rates that were set by the Judges for the 
2006–2010 time period, and also permitted SoundExchange to negotiate roy-
alty rates for the 2011–2015 time period.122 
Congress recognized that certain webcasting business models warranted or 
might even require experimental settlement agreements, because if those set-
tlements were classified as precedent-setting in royalty-rate proceedings, then 
                                                
 115 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 24,084, 24,084 (May 1, 2007). 
 116 The Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, § 
3, 118 Stat. 2341, 2341–42, 2357–58, 2365 (2004) [hereinafter CRDRA]. 
 117 Id. § 3, 118 Stat. at 2341. The CRDRA phased out the CARP system that had been 
part of the Copyright Office since 1993. CRDRA replaced CARP (which itself replaced the 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal in 1993) with the Copyright Royalty Board. The Copyright 
Royalty Judges are appointed for six-year terms with an opportunity for reappointment. 
However, the first three judges serve two-, four- and six-year terms, so as to stagger terms 
and avoid replacement of all three judges at one time. Id. § 3, 118 Stat. at 2345. 
 118 CARP Report, supra note 23, at 7–8. 
 119 See generally Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114). 
 120 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, § 2, 123 Stat. 1926, 1926 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114). 
 121 Exclusive Interview with SoundExchange President Mike Huppe, SOUNDEXCHANGE, 
http://commcns.org/1lNu6hR (last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (“SoundExchange is a non-profit 
performance right organization that collects statutory royalties from satellite radio (such as 
SIRIUS XM), Internet radio (like Pandora), cable TV music channels and similar platforms 
for streaming sound recordings. The Copyright Royalty Board, which is appointed by The 
U.S. Library of Congress, has entrusted SoundExchange as the sole entity in the United 
States to collect and distribute these digital performance royalties on behalf of featured and 
non-featured recording artists, master rights owners (usually record labels), and independent 
artists who record and own their masters.”). 
 122 About Digital Royalties, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://commcns.org/1lNu6hR (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2014). 
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parties might not enter into settlements in the first place.123 Notably, any com-
mercial webcaster may choose the terms of this agreement over the terms of 
the March 2007 CRB decision124 meaning companies can choose the terms by 
which they abide. 
The ability to choose between the WSA versus the CRB terms compounds 
the already-complex determination of webcasting royalty rates. For instance, 
between the broad categories of “commercial webcaster” and “noncommercial 
webcaster,” a company can usually easily identify under which category it 
falls.125 However, a webcaster must then further determine where it fits within 
each broad category. For instance, under the commercial webcaster grouping, 
there are eight subcategories from which to determine where a company fits: 
(1) commercial webcasters following the CRB rates; (2) commercial 
webcasters following the WSA rates; (3) broadcasters; (4) small broadcasters; 
(5) pureplay broadcasters; (6) small pureplay webcasters; (7) small webcasters; 
and (8) microcasters.126 Noncommercial webcaster classification is no easier. 
Under the noncommercial webcaster grouping, there are five subcategories.127 
According to the pureplay settlement, every pureplay webcaster must make 
a $25,000 minimum payment on an annual basis, which serves as a deposit 
against the overall royalty payments for the year, should the overall payment 
exceed $25,000.128 In order to calculate the royalty payments for pureplay, 
webcasters are divided into three groups. Large webcasters, who are defined as 
entities with at least $1.25 million in annual revenues,129 must pay the greater 
of 25% of total revenues or a “per performance” rate that is about half of that 
                                                
 123 This concern resulted from the fact that relatively few meaningful settlements oc-
curred prior to previous statutory webcasting proceedings. 
 124 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009 § 2. 
 125 See Commercial Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://commcns.org/1gvKyqB (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2014) (“Webcasters which are neither tax-exempt under Section 501 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (e.g. churches, schools, etc.) nor owned by a governmental entity are 
‘commercial’ webcasters.”); Noncommercial Webcaster, SOUNDEXCHANGE, 
http://commcns.org/1jnDHdT (“Services which are owned by a governmental entity for 
public purposes or owned by a tax-exempt service under Section 501 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code (e.g., churches, schools, etc.) must operate as ‘noncommercial’ webcasters. . . . 
(The ‘noncommercial’ status of a webcaster is not based on an absence of advertisements or 
commercials on the web site or within the programming.)”). 
 126 Commercial Webcaster, supra note 125. 
 127 Noncommercial Webcaster, supra note 125 (describing the five noncommercial 
webcasting categories: (1) noncommercial webcasters following the CRB rates; (2) non-
commercial webcasters following the WSA rates; (3) noncommercial microcasters; (4) non-
commercial educational webcasters; and (5) specific webcasters industry organizations clas-
sify under public radio). 
 128 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 18, at 1524–27 (discussing the royalty rates set for 
various webcasting services in much greater detail). 
 129 See id. at 1526. 
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established by the March 2007 CRB decision.130 For example, the settlement 
set the 2013 rate at $0.00120 per song per listener, while the March 2007 CRB 
decision set the rate at $0.0018 per song per listener.131 In addition, large 
webcasters must submit census filings of playlist reports.132 These monthly fil-
ings contain information regarding every song played as opposed to quarterly 
reports of songs played during two seven-day periods during each quarter.133 
These reports must be retained for at least a three-year period.134 
Small webcasters, another category of webcasters, are defined as entities 
having fewer than $1.25 million in annual revenues and with less than the 
maximum allowable “aggregate tuning hours” (“ATH”) in the year, which 
ranges from 8 million to 10 million ATH.135 Small webcasters must pay the 
greater of a percentage of revenue, calculated as follows, for the 2009–2015 
period: 12% of the first $250,000 in revenue and a higher rate of 14% for reve-
nue in excess of $250,000, or, in the alternative, 7% of expenses.136 In addition, 
these small webcasters must also submit census filings of playlist reports, 
which consist of information about every song played.137 However, small 
webcasters can pay a proxy fee in exchange for relaxed reporting require-
ments.138 Pureplay webcasters, such as Pandora, who offer subscription serv-
ices in addition to a pure music stream must pay a rate identical to that paid by 
broadcasters participating in the SoundExchange/NAB deal.139 SoundExchange 
pitched a “discounted rate structure” to content owners as an experiment, as-
serting that the original rates themselves were fair.140 
Since the implementation of these rate structures, Pandora and other 
webcasters have continuously complained that the royalty rates are too high 
and envision heavy users as ultimately bearing the majority of increased, asso-
ciated costs from advertising and other methods to increase revenues.141 In or-
                                                
 130 See id. at 1524–25. 
 131 See id. at 1524–26. 
 132 See id. 
 133 See id. at 1526. 
 134 37 C.F.R. § 370.3(h) (2012). 
 135 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 18, at 1526–27. 
 136 See id. at 1527. 
 137 See id. at 1527–28. 
 138 See id. at 1521–22. 
 139 See id. at 1524–26. 
 140 See Press Release, SoundExchange, SoundExchange and “PurePlay” Webcasters 
Reach Unprecedented Experimental Rate Agreement (July 7, 2009), available at 
http://commcns.org/1iljyp4 (according to SoundExchange, “Time will tell if revenue sharing 
is the right move for both the recording community and webcasters . . . but we’re willing to 
take the risk in the hope that artists, rights holders and webcasters can all benefit”). 
 141 See Eric Egelman, Pandora CEO Pushes Congress for Lower Royalties, BLOOMBERG 
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://commcns.org/1on1UZF (stating that the company’s royalty burden is 
currently impermissibly calculated and too high). 
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der to reduce substantially the overall royalty burden of both the recording and 
publishing royalties, some companies like Pandora have creatively shaped their 
business models to qualify for lower royalty calculations for musical works,142 
in addition to pushing for the IRFA legislation aimed at recording royalties. 
Ultimately, these efforts on behalf of webcasters like Pandora demonstrate that 
these companies will pursue multiple creative means to reduce royalty burdens, 
in the hope that either on the publishing side or the recording side, the royalty 
burden will be lessened. 
 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PANDORA WEBCASTING MODEL 
 
While a number of webcasters exist in the United States, Pandora remains 
one of the leading webcasters with approximately 175 million registered us-
ers.143 In a one year period, Pandora nearly doubled the amount of content 
streamed; users streamed 14.01 billion hours of content for the fiscal year end-
ing January 31, 2013,144 significantly more than the 8.2 billion hours of content 
streamed in 2012.145 
As a pureplay webcaster,146 Pandora falls under the compulsive royalty bur-
den of $0.12 per song played, heavily relying upon advertising revenue to meet 
this burden.147 Currently, Pandora offers two models to its subscribers: an ad-
supported service provided free of charge, and a subscription-based service 
called Pandora One.148 The free service enables listeners to access content li-
braries and up to 100 personalized playlist stations interrupted by periodic ad-
vertisements.149 The institution of a listening cap of 320 hours per month on 
desktop and personal computers serves as one major drawback for those who 
heavily use its service.150 However, Pandora reports that very few listeners ex-
ceed this cap.151 For those listeners that do exceed the cap, Pandora reserves the 
                                                
 142 Glenn Peoples, Pandora Buys Terrestrial Radio Station in North Dakota, Aims for 
Lower ASCAP Royalties, BILLBOARD.BIZ (July 11, 2013), http://commcns.org/1rafn9c. 
 143 Pandora 2013 Form 10-K, supra note 47, at 2 (defining registered users are defined as 
“the total number of accounts that have been created for our service at period end”). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 3. 
 146 Id. at 3–5. Unlike traditional radio stations that broadcast the same content to all lis-
teners at the same time, Pandora’s content is broadcast to each individual listener based 
upon an algorithm, called “The Music Genome Project.” Id. The algorithm assembles user 
data to create playlists, which “predict listener music preference, play music content suited 
to the tastes of each individual listener and introduce listeners to music they will love.” Id. 
 147 Id. at 9. 
 148 Id. at 3. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
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right through its terms of service to charge a $0.99 fee.152 
Listeners accessing Pandora’s free service through devices other than a per-
sonal computer have access to unlimited playing time of music and other con-
tent, like stand-up comedy.153 A large majority of Pandora users access the 
service through their tablets or mobile devices.154 As more and more listeners 
opt to stream Pandora music through their mobile devices,155 Pandora is insti-
tuting a listening cap on those mobile users156 because registered users carry 
their mobile devices on their person and will have substantially more access to 
Pandora on their phones. The shift in the user listening methods radically alters 
the amount of time one can access the service. For instance, user time is natu-
rally limited in the traditional listening method on a desktop or laptop com-
puter, as users periodically step away from their computers, or leave their 
computers at the end of a workday. 
In addition to the free service provided by Pandora, listeners have the option 
of subscribing to Pandora One, a subscription service through which subscrib-
ers pay either $3.99 for a one-month subscription or $36.00 for a one-year sub-
scription.157 The advantages of paying for Pandora One include the elimination 
of ads, unlimited listening time, and higher quality audio streams.158 Approxi-
mately 13% of Pandora’s total revenue in fiscal year 2012 was achieved 
through this subscription service.159 Pandora hopes to persuade more users to 
join its subscription service; however, not many users have converted from the 
paid service.160 
Nevertheless, as more companies enter the Internet-radio market,161 Pandora 
will likely find it increasingly difficult to convince users to pay for Pandora 
One when many webcasters provide free, ad-supported services. If a substan-
tial majority of Pandora’s registered users continue to utilize the free service 
and Pandora cannot increase the percentage of paid subscribers, Pandora will 
most likely need to secure a lower royalty burden in order to achieve profitabil-
ity. This is where Pandora really has the opportunity to justify a reduced roy-
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alty burden: if Pandora can demonstrate that it acts more than a mere host of 
copyrighted content and, instead, provides a valuable service that significantly 
impacts or enhances the user experience of that copyrighted content,162 then 
Pandora has a stronger argument to reduce the sound recording royalties paid. 
Without a reduced royalty structure, Pandora will likely continue posting fi-
nancial deficits. Pandora currently has an accumulated deficit of $139.6 mil-
lion due to its inability to generate sufficient revenues as the number of listen-
ing hours increases and the royalties paid for content acquisition also continue 
increasing.163 Pandora explicitly acknowledges that at the current webcasting 
royalty rates, the advertising revenue generated may not be enough to offset 
content royalty expenses even with the relatively low subscription rate of Pan-
dora One.164 Approximately 88% of Pandora’s revenue comes from advertising 
sales, but these advertising agreements are short term and are generally termi-
nable at any time by the advertiser.165 Particularly, as Pandora listenership 
shifts to mobile devices, Pandora must continue capturing a majority of its 
revenues through advertising and continue increasing its listener base in the 
mobile platform if it plans to continue its current business model.166 
Pandora recently initiated an experiment with its current business model to 
reduce its royalty burden regarding performance royalties. In its desperation to 
lessen its royalty burden, Pandora sought to substantially reduce its perform-
ance licensing fees by making a very bold move: Pandora strategically pur-
chased a terrestrial radio station in South Dakota.167 Pandora purchased a small 
station that only has a listenership of 108,000 people in the spring of 2013, an 
interesting move considering over 70 million people listen to Pandora each 
month.168 By acquiring this small terrestrial station, Pandora attempts to take 
advantage of reduced performance royalty fees169 available to broadcast radio 
stations.170 While the small station acquisition directly relates to performance 
royalties issues and not sound recording royalties that are the subject of the 
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IRFA, Pandora’s move exemplifies the varying methods and experiments 
webcasters will consider in order to decrease their overall royalty burdens. 
This importantly demonstrates that reduced royalties are sought from both the 
musical recording owners (the PROs and songwriters) as well as the sound 
recording owners. This could have a substantially negative impact on the live-
lihood of musical content creation and have negative implications for the 
sustainability of the music industry. 
 
IV. THE INTERNET RADIO FAIRNESS ACT OF 2012 
 
As a result of Pandora’s purported royalty woes, the company hired Wash-
ington lobbyists in 2012 to assist it in securing recalculated sound recording 
royalty rates for webcasters.171 Pandora lobbied for the passage of a bill that 
would change how the CRB determines webcasters’ statutory royalty rates for 
the digital performances of sound recordings by using the 801(b)(1) Stan-
dard.172 The culmination of Pandora’s efforts resulted in the proposal of the 
IRFA in the fall of 2012.173 
While the IRFA ultimately failed to pass, it would have altered federal law 
by changing the DMCA standard currently applied by CRJs to establish com-
pulsory licensing royalty rates for the public performance of sound recordings 
by noninteractive digital audio services.174 The current standard established 
rates and terms based upon the willing buyer/willing seller standard.175 In de-
termining the applicable royalty rates, the IRFA would have required CRJs to 
make the following considerations: (1) the public’s interest in both the creation 
of new sound recordings of musical works and in fostering online and other 
digital performances of sound recordings; (2) the income necessary to provide 
a reasonable return on all relevant investments, including investments in prior 
periods for which returns have not been earned; (3) the value of any promo-
tional benefit or other non-monetary benefit conferred on the copyright owner 
by the performance (i.e., radio promotional benefits that terrestrial radio 
claims); and (4) the contributions made by the digital audio transmission serv-
ice to the content and value of its programming.176 
In addition, the IRFA would have authorized a $500.00 minimum, annual 
administrative fee on top of the royalty rates paid.177 The burden of proof would 
have been placed on sound recording copyright owners to establish that fees 
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and terms they seek satisfy the requirements instituted by the IRFA and do not 
exceed the fees to which most copyright owners and users would agree under 
competitive market circumstances.178   
The IRFA sought to establish licensing fee structures, aimed at fostering 
competition among the licensors of sound recording performances and between 
sound recording performances and other programming.179 Further, CRJs would 
have been prohibited from disfavoring a percentage of revenue-based fees and 
taking into account the rates and terms in licenses for interactive services or the 
determinations rendered by CRJs prior to the enactment of this Act.180 This 
would eliminate any attempts to examine royalty rates across digital service 
types and examine whether or not the rates are appropriate based upon the 
market. 
The IRFA would also have allowed particular transmitting organizations en-
titled to transmit a performance to the public to make more than one copy or 
phonorecord embodying a performance or display of a work for its own trans-
missions, archival preservation, or security.181 Currently, no more than one 
copy can be made for such purposes.182 By allowing more than one copy to be 
made, the exclusive rights of the content owners are further restricted.  
Furthermore, the IRFA would have required common agents or collectives 
representing copyright owners of sound recording to make available a compre-
hensive, centralized list of copyright licensing information via the Internet.183 
The list’s aim was to facilitate licensing and to provide greater transparency to 
the public and companies.184 A centralized list could absolutely be helpful in 
the facilitating of licensing, but would be a costly undertaking due to massive 
songwriter catalogs as well as the vagueness of the statute’s language. In addi-
tion, many of the collectives, like PROs, already have their own databases,185 
so why add another one to the mix? With multiple rights owners in songs and 
sound recordings, it could be problematic in determining which party amongst 
those rights owners bears the burden of providing the copyright information. 
Finally, the evidentiary, procedural, and judicial review standards would 
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have been revised under the IRFA for CRJ proceedings and determinations.186 
In those proceedings which determine the terms and rates of royalty payments 
for digital performances of sound recordings, participants are required during 
voluntary negotiations to disclose: previous license agreements entered into by 
the participant, its members, or participant-represented licensors or licensees 
during a specified preceding five-year period; or other documents relied upon 
in rate-setting proceedings.187 The Librarian of Congress would have been re-
quired to submit recommendations to Congress on how the federal government 
can facilitate, and possibly establish, a global music registry that is sustainably 
financed and consistent with the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”) obligations.188 
 
A. The IRFA’s Supporters 
 
The IRFA addressed laws that its supporters claim disadvantaged the Inter-
net radio compared to other digital services.189 Supporters of the bill, such as 
Senator Ron Wyden, voiced concern that barriers to innovation in digital 
broadcasting hamper the abilities of webcasters and Internet radio businesses 
to start up, create competition, and create jobs in the digital music market-
place.190 Legislators backing the IRFA were concerned with musicians’ and 
songwriters’ abilities to market themselves, obtain exposure to audiences, and 
their abilities to receive adequate compensation for their music.191 According to 
these legislators, IRFA would have addressed those concerns.192 
In addition to the claim that the IRFA would assist content creators and the 
music industry as a whole, supporters claimed the IRFA would have benefitted 
consumers by providing more avenues for broader digital music access and 
would have also provided those consumers with “diverse music choices.”193 
Senator Wyden claimed that the IRFA would end discrimination against Inter-
net radio by treating it the same as satellite and cable radio.194 
Supporters also believed that the WBWS standard could not apply because 
“there is no functioning market for these licenses and . . . judges are left with 
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very little information to make reasonable conclusions.”195 Senator Wyden spe-
cifically asserted that the current rate setting for Internet Radio has directly led 
to webcasters paying five times the amount of royalties as other digital music 
formats like satellite and cable.196 Through implementation of the IRFA, sup-
porters believed that the CRJs could establish royalty rates based upon a 
broader set of factors delineated under the 801(b)(1) standard.197 
The IRFA has garnered support from a group of Internet radio service pro-
viders, broadcast radio companies, and others concerned about the Internet 
radio industry’s future.198 Some of these stakeholders formed the Internet Radio 
Fairness Coalition (“IRFC” or “Coalition”) in October 2012 “to advocate for 
legislation that would establish an equitable royalty rate setting standard for 
Internet radio.”199 The IRFC claimed that the current standard that determines 
how webcasting should pay the recording industry, is out of balance and 
grossly unfair.200 In the digital marketplace, the current system of determining 
how licensing rates are paid is ancient and out of step with the current realities 
of the digital music business.201 The Coalition supported the IRFA for a number 
of reasons, as iterated by other supporters. It claimed that digital music con-
sumers would have a greater variety of music choices.202 The IRFA would en-
able artists to earn incrementally greater royalty payments as Internet radio 
continues its growth.203 Artists, IRFC claimed, would have a better connection 
with fans through marketing, merchandising, and tours.204 The IRFA could es-
tablish a “sustainable digital marketplace” to act as a basis for digital music 
entrepreneurs to create new and innovative methods and services for delivering 
digital music content to the listeners.205 Finally, IRFC claimed that the IRFA 
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would result in greater revenues for record labels, the primary deliverers of 
digital music content on the Internet.206 
Additionally, the IRFC claimed that the IRFA would have enabled artists to 
make more money through the accelerating growth and innovation of Internet 
radio.207 The Coalition argued that “the more the sector grows, the more their 
music is played, and the more opportunities they will have to reach their audi-
ences, who are spending more time than ever looking for music online.”208 
However, this belief rests on the assumption that this Internet radio growth will 
occur quickly and, therefore, afford copyright owners the opportunity to earn 
more royalties at the 801(b)(1) Standard through broader digital radio con-
sumption. There is no guarantee, however. 
Some scholars contend that streaming does not completely destroy overall 
sales of music, as long as the number of digital music subscribers paying for 
music continues to “climb rapidly.”209 However, with the introduction of other 
nonsubscription radio services like iRadio, it is likely that consumers will dis-
continue their paid subscriptions and will, instead, opt for nonpaid deliveries. 
As one scholar posited, “There is a point at which there would be 100[%] can-
nibalization [of permanent digital downloading and brick-and-mortar sales], 
and we would make more money through subscription services . . . [w]e calcu-
late that point at approximately 20 million worldwide subscribers.”210 Hope-
fully, this point is in the near future, as recent statistics indicate permanent 
downloads have begun sharply declining.211 
One proponent asserted that the standards utilized in royalty rate settings 
should support sustainable growth and, in addition, the same standard should 
be applied to satellite, Internet radio, and cable royalty calculations.212 Pres-
ently, the amount of music played by listeners is suppressed and this, in turn, 
prevents artists and record labels from earning money.213 The main and most 
controversial argument that the Coalition has made is as follows: 
[R]ecord labels and their allies don’t seem to understand how to help de-
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velop a sustainable market, and without that expertise they have defaulted to 
simply pushing for rates that cause possible new entrants to decide against en-
tering the market and existing players to either drop out or reduce their vol-
ume.214 
The Coalition concludes that the digital marketplace will ultimately collapse 
unless structures are implemented that facilitate the growth of a real, sustain-
able marketplace, and the parties should focus on the licensing-marketplace 
picture as a whole, because artists receive compensation based upon volume of 
plays.215 The Coalition’s argument lacks merit because new webcasting parties, 
like iTunes Radio and Beats Music, continue to enter the market.216 However, 
the fact that Beats Music chose a subscription-only service arguably suggests 
that the company believes that the royalty burden is too high for it to be profit-
able.217 On the other hand, Beats Music could simply be making smarter busi-
ness decisions than other webcasters by charging customers a small monthly 
fee. 
 
B. The Royalty Standard Comparison 
 
While the IRFA addresses multiple aspects of Internet radio, most of the 
controversy has centered on the proposal to adopt the 801(b)(1) Standard, leav-
ing the WBWS Standard behind. The 801(b)(1) Standard and the WBWS stan-
dard disparately treat the parties, ultimately resulting in wide variation between 
royalties paid to content owners depending upon the type of digital service 
provided. 
 
1. The 801(b)(1) Standard218 
 
At the heart of the IRFA controversy lies the 801(b)(1) Standard, section 
114(f) of the Copyright Act empowered the CRJs to set rates, absent voluntary 
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agreements reached by the parties.219 With rate-setting, the statutorily set objec-
tives are: 
(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public; (B) To af-
ford the copyright owner a fair return for his or her creative work and the copy-
right user a fair income under existing economic conditions; (C) To reflect the 
relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product 
made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, 
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to 
the opening of new markets for creative expression and media for their com-
munication; and (D) To minimize any disruptive impact on the structure of the 
industries involved and on generally prevailing industry practices.220 
The CRJs may make determinations concerning the adjustment of compul-
sory license royalty rates.221 In addition, the CRJs may make determinations 
concerning the adjustment of reasonable copyright royalty rates under various 
types of licenses.222 
The CRJs may also make determinations concerning the adjustment of copy-
right royalty rates under licenses governing secondary transmissions, solely in 
accordance with certain statutory provisions.223 The Judges must weigh all 
relevant considerations and set out their conclusions in a form that permits 
adequate judicial review.224 Additionally, copyright royalty rate adjustment 
proceedings may be conducted every fifth calendar year, and the Judges may 
not conduct proceedings more frequently.225 During those calendar years, any 
owner or user of a copyrighted work whose royalty rates are specified or estab-
lished by the Copyright Act may file a petition with the CRJs declaring a rate 
determination or adjustment.226 Additionally, no burden of proof on a party 
seeking rate adjustment exists.227 
In addition, courts substantially defer to the ratemaking decisions of the 
CRB, because Congress expressly tasked it with balancing the conflicting 
statutory objectives enumerated in the Copyright Act.228 To the extent that the 
statutory objectives determine a range of reasonable royalty rates that would 
serve all the objectives adequately but to differing degrees, the Board is free to 
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choose among those rates.229 Courts are without authority to set aside the par-
ticular rate chosen by the Board, so long as that rate lies within a zone of rea-
sonableness.230 
 
2.  The Willing Buyer/Willing Seller Standard231 
 
Webcasters are subject to a different standard as enacted under the DMCA: 
the WBWS standard.232 The WBWS standard requires the judges to “establish 
rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have 
been negotiated in the marketplace between a wiling buyer and a willing 
seller.”233 A major concern of webcasters and the standard’s critics is that the 
standard is a theoretical determination, prohibiting the CRB from considering 
other royalty rates, relying instead upon theoretical markets for rate-setting.234 
Ironically, however, the IRFA also set such prohibitions in its proposal. In ad-
dition, the royalty rate is pre-determined for a five-year period prior to the 
commencement of that period,235 resulting in predictability of rates and busi-
ness costs. 
Some scholars claim that the WBWS standard emerged as a result of power-
ful record industry conglomerates having the loudest voices at the bargaining 
table during the DMCA negotiations.236 At that time, it was unclear how big the 
webcasting industry would grow.237 As a result, the record industry secured 
desirable royalty rates for their content.238 The proof lies in the comparison of 
Pandora, which paid royalty rates set by the CRB under the WBWS standard, 
with SiriusXM, which paid much lower royalty rates under another standard. 
According to Pandora’s annual report, the webcasting giant paid approximately 
50% of its gross revenues in royalties during fiscal year 2012 at a rate of $0.12 
per song played, and could pay around 70% in the first quarter of fiscal year 
2013.239 However, following the recent CRB ruling in 2012, under the statutory 
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license covering the performance of sound recordings over SiriusXM’s satellite 
digital audio radio service, and the making of ephemeral copies in support of 
such performances, for the five-year period starting January 1, 2013, SiriusXM 
will pay a royalty based on gross revenues of 9.5% for 2014, 10.0% for 2015, 
10.5% for 2016, and 11% for 2017.240 While SiriusXM now pays an escalating 
rate that is higher, those royalty rates are still nowhere near those paid by Pan-
dora, highlighting the extreme variation in royalty rates between types of digi-
tal services. 
Royalty parity is a goal that should be reached, but not at the expense of the 
creators themselves and their abilities to adequately compensated. Content 
owners provide the musical content, the sole reason that consumers flock to 
webcasting websites. Webcasting services like Pandora merely add value 
through their curation of content and the technology playing that content. 
Without the musical content, only advertisements would remain on the 
webcasting sites. Consumers do not flock to webcasting sites for ads; those 
consumers seek the products of the content creators: the music. Without the 
provided content, nothing remains to attract users and webcasters cannot main-
tain a viable radio service. 
Furthermore, the argument that webcasting providers are not viable compa-
nies in the long-term fails to persuade. Recently released reports of webcaster 
revenues and valuations show that these companies are thriving and will con-
tinue to do so.241 Webcasters continue to enter the market. For instance, Apple 
entered the Internet radio market and has invested millions of dollars in its 
webcasting service, iTunes Radio.242 If the webcasting business failed to be a 
profitable endeavor, why would large technology giants seek entrance into the 
Internet radio market? Simply put: the evidence strongly suggests that 
webcasting is a profitable endeavor on a long-term basis and can, therefore, 
support paying the content owners a fair royalty rate under the WBWS Stan-
dard. 
 
V. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION 
 
Ultimately, new webcasters entering the Internet radio marketplace should 
have the opportunity to thrive, but not at the expense of the copyright owners 
to which their success is dependent upon. While webcasters claim that the 
801(b)(1) royalty standard could arguably allow Internet radio companies the 
chance to thrive by providing a more stable and predictive royalty calculation, 
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this “stability” should not be at the expense of content creators that provide the 
very content attracting users to the webcasting services. The free-market stan-
dard embodied in the WBWS Standard allows copyright owners to obtain fair 
compensation for their creative contributions. While no perfect solution exists, 
the WBWS standard best achieves the most equitable compensation model for 
all parties involved until the legislature can reconsider the royalty rate structure 
in the next Copyright Act. 
 
